How I Audited My Infra After the LiteLLM Supply Chain Attack (And What I'm Doing Differently Now)

I woke up to a Slack thread on March 24, 2026, that made my stomach drop. LiteLLM, the Python proxy I'd been running to route LLM calls across providers, had been backdoored with credential-stealing malware. Versions 1.82.7 and 1.82.8, published by a threat actor called TeamPCP, contained a three-stage payload that harvested SSH keys, cloud credentials, Kubernetes secrets, and cryptocurrency wallets. PyPI quarantined the entire package. What surprised me was the targeting. LiteLLM is literally an API key management gateway. It holds credentials for every LLM provider your org uses. If you wanted to compromise one package to get access to everything, this was the perfect pick. This wasn't a one-off either. It was the third hit in a five-day campaign. Aqua Security's Trivy scanner got compromised on March 19 (GHSA-69fq-xp46-6x23). Checkmarx's KICS GitHub Actions followed on March 23 (kics-github-action#152, Checkmarx Update). LiteLLM was the final target on March 24 (litellm#24512, LiteL